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This Special Issue has focused on three crises that have hit the European Union (EU) in the 
past decade; the economic and financial crisis (the ‘Great Recession’), the migrant crisis, and 
Brexit. As we have seen, the crises have been different in their nature and consequences, 
and gave rise to socioeconomic as well as sociocultural concerns within member states, in 
addition to raising broader questions about the sustainability of the European integration 
project. Each of these crises has offered opportunities for populist parties, which are 
defined by their defence of the ‘pure people’ and popular sovereignty against the 
unscrupulous actions of unresponsive or corrupt elites (e.g. Mudde 2004). Not only do such 
parties mobilise on the basis of real or perceived crises and elite failure, the events in the 
past decade also lend credence to the various Eurosceptic arguments voiced by populist 
actors on the socioeconomic left as well as the culturally conservative right (see Hooghe et 
al. 2002; de Vries and Edwards 2009). The last few years have seen waves of populism and 
Euroscepticism breaking together.  
 
On the basis of these assumptions, the first question we asked was if, and how, the 
ideological contours of populist Euroscepticism have changed as a result of the three crises. 
At the same time, we recognised that Euroscepticism, like other elements of populist 
parties’ agendas, is not necessarily the prerogative of populist parties only. Certainly, when 
such parties pose a real electoral threat to mainstream competitors, the latter are forced to 
respond to the challenge; one possible way being a co-optation of the Eurosceptic agenda. 
Thus, a second question we posed was if, and how, populist Eurosceptic discourses have 
reverberated across the party politics creating effects in the wider political processes of 
European politics. 
 
To address these questions, we have looked at populist Eurosceptic parties in a number of 
West European countries and these case studies comprise the Special Issue contributions. 
Looking at Britain, Tim Bale (2018) focuses on the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and its 
relationship to the Conservative Party. Gilles Ivaldi (2018) looks at the French case and at 
the recent changes to the agenda of the Front National (National Front, FN) under the 
leadership of Marine Le Pen. Charles Lees (2018) considers the recent rise of the Alternative 
für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD). Sofia Vasilopoulou (2018) looks across the 
key parties in Greece where she argues that populism and Euroscepticism are pervasive. 
Andrea Pirro and Stijn van Kessel (2018) look comparatively at Italy and the Netherlands 
covering the Movimento 5 Stelle (5 Star Movement, M5S) and the Lega Nord (Northern 
League, LN) in Italy and Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom, PVV) and the 
Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party, SP) in the Netherlands. Margarita Gómez-Reino 
Cachafeiro and Carolina Plaza-Colodro (2018) address the cases of Spain and Portugal 
looking, among others, at Podemos and the Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc, BE) respectively. 
Nicolò Conti (2018) rounds off the cases by looking across a range of cases at the attitudes 
of national political elites towards the EU.  
 
In this conclusion, we seek to bring together the findings of these contributions to this 
Special Issue and to make some comparative observations based on the cases. On the basis 
of a collection of comparative and single-country studies focusing on a range of EU member 
states, we are able to formulate several conclusions about the nature of populist 
Euroscepticism as expressed by the populist actors themselves, as well as how the populists 
affected the political debate and stances in respective party systems. One key observation is 
that, although there is diversity across the cases, there is an overall picture of resilience 
against populist Euroscepticism. We subsequently discuss how our findings relate to existing 
literature on populism, Euroscepticism, and party competition more generally, and conclude 
with several avenues for further research.  
 
 
European crises and populist Eurosceptic responses 
 
Although the three crises had a wide impact across European states, they played out 
differently in different contexts. From a comparative vantage point, it is interesting to note 
how the effects of the Great Recession had been ‘momentous’ and widespread. This was 
particularly the case in those countries that suffered severe financial difficulties and whose 
populations faced far-reaching austerity measures. Meanwhile, the reluctance of citizens in 
‘creditor’ countries to bail out Eurozone ‘debtors’ revealed the limits of pan-European 
solidarity. And yet, out of the three crises we have focused upon, the Great Recession is the 
one whose (institutional) legacies are harder to assess in terms of ‘critical juncture’ with 
such a short hindsight (Pirro and Taggart 2018). Looking at the Great Recession as a (mildly) 
favourable opportunity for populist parties in Europe (Kriesi and Pappas 2015) and, thus, 
part of a structural reconfiguration, means we have to also be alive to those electoral trends 
that have much deeper roots and are not solely attributable to the consequences of the 
crisis. Precisely for this reason, we focus on crises as both bringing in new challenges but 
also playing into older and more established trends of populism and Euroscepticism. 
Essentially, we are interested in ascertaining how crises are played out in populist 
Eurosceptic discourses. 
 
While all countries have been – in one way or another – affected by the negative 
consequences of the Great Recession, the effects of the exceptional migratory flows into 
Europe and the challenge to European integration epitomised by Brexit had specific effects 
on different states. When the humanitarian crisis reached its most visible peak, we could at 
best speak of new migratory routes and entry points (e.g. Milan and Pirro 2018), but 
immigration was already a prominent issue on the political agenda in various European 
countries. In this respect, the politicisation of the issue proved easier and, often, electorally 
successful in countries of first arrival (e.g. Hungary) as well as those of (desired) destination 
(e.g. Germany). The politicisation of the crisis by populist radical right parties clearly 
contributed to the framing of immigration in ethnopluralist and security terms, and also 
fuelled Eurosceptic sentiments in a context where it might be expected that the EU itself 
should have a role in responding to this issue. It is clear that populist Eurosceptic parties 
have also increased the salience of Euroscepticism, and of the EU issue in general within 
their party system.  
 
Brexit, in contrast to the other two crises, started out as a sui generis and context-specific 
response to a strained relationship between the EU and one member state, and the chances 
that referendums on EU withdrawal could spread like wildfire were always unlikely. The 
complex aftermath of the Brexit referendum has made the issue a limited one for populists 
of any ideology to mobilise around. The Front National’s U-turn on ‘Frexit’ amid a heated 
presidential campaign, or the Italian populist parties’ recent backtracking on referendums 
on exit from the Euro are, in our opinion, quite telling. This notwithstanding, Brexit is the 
crisis that comes closer to our understandings of critical juncture and transformative event. 
Simply put, Brexit comes across as a far-reaching and dramatic change that will be difficult 
to alter or reverse.  
 
If we turn to the responses to the crisis by populist Eurosceptics, we can also see that the 
varying nature of the crises reflected differently on the framings of ‘Europe’. As the 
contributions in this Special Issue demonstrate, left-wing populists, who see the EU as a 
force furthering a ‘neoliberal’ agenda and harming the interests of ordinary workers, could 
aim to capitalise on the austerity measures ostensibly imposed by EU institutions, and their 
negative social and economic consequences. On the other hand, proposals to seek a 
common solution for the inflow of non-EU migrants could be interpreted by right-wing 
populists as an attempt by the EU to force even more immigration and multiculturalism 
upon its member states. Brexit, an event that showed European integration is reversible, 
could be hailed by various kinds of populist parties as a victory for the ordinary people 
against unresponsive elites, and a rejection of the undemocratic and technocratic decision-
making process at the EU level.  
 
The theoretical implications of the migration crisis in terms of populist Eurosceptic framing 
were particularly evident – at least, for those populist parties with nativist leanings. After 
engaging with socioeconomic issues in the face of the Great Recession (Pirro and van Kessel 
2017), populist radical right parties tipped the balance of contention in their favour by 
swiftly returning to their ideological ‘comfort zone’. Leaving aside the poor management 
and slow response of supranational institutions amid the humanitarian crisis, which may 
have raised doubts on EU efficacy among populists and non-populists alike, the ‘long 
summer of migration’ became a focusing event in that it helped reignite ethnopluralist and 
Eurosceptic discourses in a context of seeming disarray. It should therefore come as no 
surprise that populist parties such as the AfD, which initially defined their opposition to 
Europe in socioeconomic terms, expanded their agenda to anti-immigration. 
 The different crises thus extended the range of Eurosceptic frames typically employed by 
populist parties. Populists criticised European integration for its malign socioeconomic 
consequences, its threat to national sovereignty or cultural homogeneity, the creation of an 
illegitimate supranational system of governance, or a combination of the above. In addition, 
these parties could be expected to intensify or highlight their Eurosceptic arguments, and to 
adapt their framing of European integration as each crisis unfolded.  
 
Generally speaking, the evidence from our cases corroborates our expectation that populist 
parties pushed their Eurosceptic discourses in reaction to the European crises. Populist 
parties across Europe typically took the opportunity to reiterate their objections to 
European integration at times when the EU was widely blamed for ill-advised policy 
measures or struggling to formulate an effective answer to cross-national problems.   
 
This is not to say that populist parties were united in the nature of their responses: the 
cases under investigation in this Special Issue took varying positions on either side of the 
soft and hard Euroscepticism divide. Notably, left-wing populist parties, such as the Greek 
SYRIZA, Spanish Podemos, and Dutch SP, all clearly remained on the soft side, expressing 
their discontent with the EU’s role in the Eurozone crisis in particular, but ultimately seeking 
a solution that implied a continuation of their country’s EU membership. Right-wing populist 
parties were more divided, with some maintaining, or eventually resorting to, all-out 
opposition to their country’s EU membership (e.g. UKIP and the PVV in the Netherlands), 
others essentially remaining soft-Eurosceptic or at least marked by more ambiguous or 
wavering positions (e.g. AfD, the French FN, and the LN in Italy). Ultimately, parties also 
remained divided on specific EU policies and matters such as Eurozone membership (e.g. 
the M5S in Italy).  
 
It is clear therefore that the crises have not led to a unified populist response or a wholesale 
transformation of populist Eurosceptic discourses (see also Pirro and Van Kessel 2017). On 
the whole, the crises have not seen populist Eurosceptics change tune but rather increase 
the salience and volume of existing tunes. As Bale (2018), for instance, argues in reference 
to UKIP, the Eurozone and migration crises did not make the party any more hostile to the 
EU, but ‘merely amplified its pre-existing message’. Similarly, Ivaldi (2018) demonstrates 
how in the French case ‘EU crises have been essentially ‘absorbed’ by the FN into its pre-
existing Eurosceptic framework’. In general, then, populist insurgents have treated the 
events as an opportunity for electoral mobilisation more than ideological transformation. 
 
 
The consequences of populist Euroscepticism  
 The second key question we sought to answer was how the varying populist responses to 
the European crises left their mark on the political debates in individual member states, and 
the positions of mainstream parties in particular. Under pressure from populist parties, have 
mainstream parties felt the need to co-opt Eurosceptic elements into their agenda, have 
they sought collaboration with populists, or was their strategy primarily geared at isolating 
or ignoring them? Our cases again show a composite picture and, in this section, we lay out 
the different forms of impact and the comparative results from our case studies.  
 
By bringing crises into the study of the populist politics of Euroscepticism, we were 
especially concerned with the discursive changes that may occur within, and across, party 
systems. The basic assumption underlying our effort was that ‘Europe’ had turned into a 
central ideological battlefield amid the multiple crises. As populist parties are not only here 
to stay but have also managed to exert ever growing influence on public opinion and other 
parties, we assumed that their stances on ‘Europe’ might gain significant traction. Starting 
from these premises, we engage with two aspects of their impact: frame diffusion and the 
impact of Euroscepticism on party systems. With the first, we refer to the ability of populist 
Eurosceptic parties to spread their critical framing of ‘Europe’; with the second, we speak of 
the broader consequences of populist Euroscepticism drawing from systemic 
considerations. While frame diffusion qualifies as a direct metric of discursive impact, party-
political implications relate to the responses of (mainstream) competitors and signify an 
indirect effect of populist Eurosceptic mobilisation. In essence, we contend that 
Euroscepticism, as instigated by populist parties, may become an object of contention 
between populists and non-populists; or leave a mark on national party systems purely 
based on the specific (electoral) weight gained by populist Eurosceptics in recent times. The 
range of cases included in this Special Issue allowed us to reflect on the differentiated 
effects of the multiple crises and how – and how successfully – they have been performed 
by populist Eurosceptic parties. 
 
In France, as Ivaldi (2018) demonstrates, the FN was the most prominent party beating the 
drum of Euroscepticism, initially advocating a French withdrawal from the single currency as 
a crucial theme in the run-up to the 2017 presidential elections. In its Eurosceptic discourse, 
the migrant crisis was a prominent point of reference, and the party also sought inspiration 
in the British referendum vote. In the light of Brexit, the FN softened its populist Eurosceptic 
trajectory in the final round of the 2017 presidential elections, when Marine Le Pen lost to 
the liberal pro-European candidate Emmanuel Macron. Other than that, Brexit seems so far 
to have had little impact on the party politics of the EU in France. While Euroscepticism has 
indeed turned into a viable discursive strategy for other actors across the political space 
(most notably, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, but occasionally also for presidential candidates 
Sarkozy, Fillon, and Valls), harder shades of criticism proved less successful in the elections. 
In the face of growing criticism of the EU among challenger parties, it is a moot point 
whether Euroscepticism was instigated by the FN, or a simple consequence of the crises. 
What is clearer, however, is that the oppositional discourse of the FN resonated little across 
an otherwise fairly pro-European context. 
 
The rise of AfD in Germany has put into question the traditional immunity of Germany to 
populist radical right actors. The AfD is the most evident offspring of the Great Recession 
and the most vocal political project launched to blame the EU for the economic ills of 
Europe. Leadership changes have further contributed to set the ideological trajectory of the 
party along nativist tracks. Lees (2018) notes how the AfD invested in its populist anti-
establishment profile and strenuously criticised the welcome policy of the third Merkel 
cabinet amid the migration crisis. The exceptional results returned at the 2017 general 
elections by the AfD (12.6 per cent) evidence a turning point in German politics. It is clearly 
difficult to determine how the fortunes of the AfD will evolve now that the party has 
entered the Bundestag. Without doubt, criticism of ‘Europe’ – as framed by the AfD – has 
gained very little traction and the populist politics of Euroscepticism seem set to remain 
marginal within the present scenario. Euroscepticism still represents a relatively isolated 
minority sport within the German party system, both electorally and ideologically. 
 
Greece stood out as a case of severe consequences of the Great Recession; Vasilopoulou 
(2018) presents us with a case of widespread populism across the political space. The Greek 
bailout has considerably shifted the focus of attention to Greece-EU relations, and 
challenger political forces have made a great deal of the necessity to renegotiate terms of 
EU membership. Among these forces, the populist radical left SYRIZA had been the outsider 
party to benefit the most from its Eurosceptic platform, projected as it was from extra-
parliamentary status to main opposition party in 2012 – and ultimately governing party 
since 2015. In government, it formed an unconventional alliance with the populist radical 
right ANEL, precisely on the basis of a common Eurosceptic platform based on 
socioeconomic framings. Cultural frames, stirred by the migrant crisis of 2015, were played 
out by right-wing parties, but their diffusion remained limited and the overall prospects for 
their impact on the system low. Interestingly, however, Euroscepticism as a majoritarian 
stance bore only moderate consequences. In fact, the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition soon had to 
confront the harsh truth of non-existent bargaining power at the supranational level, 
practically reducing its Euroscepticism to a mere discursive affair. 
 
Pirro and Van Kessel (2018) look at Italy and the Netherlands in a comparative perspective. 
Individually considered, we can see how Italy delivered a rather idiosyncratic instance of 
Eurosceptic overlap between two apparently non-congruent and rival populist parties, the 
M5S and the LN – this, of course, until coalition talks took off in the wake of the 2018 
general elections. We see this point of convergence as telling, at least as far as the 
ideological fluidity of the M5S is concerned. Convergence between the M5S and LN on 
issues of European integration has been stark, and the M5S practically qualified as the only 
non-straightforwardly right-wing populist party among the cases surveyed to also adopt 
cultural Eurosceptic frames in the face of the migrant crisis. Having acknowledged their slow 
but inexorable castigation of the EU for the economic stagnation and the migratory inflows, 
both parties critically questioned Italy’s continued membership of the Eurozone, only to 
tone down these aspects ahead of the 2018 elections and eventually drop them altogether 
(M5S). These elections returned the M5S as the largest party (32.8 per cent) and the LN 
(now simply called Lega in an attempt to move beyond its traditional Northern constituency) 
as the most popular party in the right-wing coalition (17.4 per cent). Besides ascertaining 
the influence that these two parties may have exerted on each other, as of March 2018 
populist Euroscepticism ostensibly is a majoritarian element in the Italian parliament. The 
traditional pro-EU balance of the Italian party system has thus been altered and the 
prospects for populist Euroscepticism may be greater than ever before. We shall see how 
populist parties will make political hay out of their criticism of Europe. 
 
The same cannot be said for the Netherlands, where Euroscepticism ultimately remains a 
phenomenon at the fringes of the ideological spectrum. The loudest Eurosceptic has long 
been Geert Wilders’s populist radical right PVV, which largely based its 2012 campaign 
around the theme. Given the PVV’s prominence, Eurosceptic frames have certainly gained a 
place within the fragmented Dutch party system. Mainstream parties, particularly those on 
the centre-right, have also been careful to publicly curb their enthusiasm for further 
European integration, stressing that ‘Brussels’ should focus on key tasks only. Wilders’s 
party was the only one, however, to support a Dutch withdrawal from the EU – at least, until 
the modest breakthrough of a radical right newcomer in 2017, Forum voor Democratie 
(Forum for Democracy, FvD). What is more, ‘Europe’ featured much less prominently in the 
PVV’s lacklustre electoral campaign of 2017, showing for one how Wilders did not treat the 
Brexit vote in the UK as an incentive to reinvigorate his campaign to leave the EU. During 
this campaign, European integration was also not a central issue for the left-wing Socialist 
Party (SP). Although the SP has always criticised the neo-liberal nature of the European 
‘super state’, it has clearly shied away from taking a hard-Eurosceptic position, and in some 
instances – like the migrant crisis – called on EU members to cooperate more closely.     
 
In the Iberian Peninsula, the migrant crisis did not play a significant role. Portugal and Spain 
were not in the migratory routes and did not come across as desired countries of 
destination. The Eurosceptic battle was therefore fought over the consequences of the 
economic and financial crisis. Gómez-Reino and Plaza-Colodro (2018) suggest that economic 
issues and anti-austerity measures were transforming elements for the two party systems, 
propelling the fortunes of new, or newly transformed, populist radical left parties. In 
Portugal, populist Eurosceptic parties have joined the left-wing government coalition led by 
the Socialist Party, de facto centring the dynamics of contention on economic issues and the 
EU. While the specific weight of Euroscepticism has been high in systemic terms, the 
diffusion of these frames beyond populist parties has been more modest. Somewhat 
differently, the Great Recession opened up opportunities for a new left populist party, 
Podemos. The change brought about by the emergence of the movement party has been no 
less than momentous in altering the Spanish party system. 
 
The UK relationship with the EU has traditionally been lukewarm. Euroscepticism has 
progressively permeated through the party system, reaching its tipping point with the 
referendum on the country’s withdrawal from the EU in June 2016. The Conservative Party 
in the UK provides an obvious example of mainstream party Euroscepticism moving beyond 
the confines of mere rhetoric. After the Brexit vote, Conservative Party ‘Brexiteers’ occupied 
key positions within the party organisation as well as the government. Bale (2018) in his 
article highlights the complex tango between UKIP and the Conservatives, with significant 
shifts in positions on ‘Europe’. The presence of UKIP has plainly contributed to the calling of 
the referendum on Brexit and significantly altered the Conservative Party’s trajectory on 
Europe. In UKIP’s discourse, moreover, the migrant crisis provided additional reasons as to 
why the country should leave the EU and regain control over its borders. UKIP’s 
Euroscepticism placed socioeconomic issues and immigration at the centre of attention for 
British politics. Against this backdrop, the impact of UKIP’s Euroscepticism has been 
enormous as much as disruptive, and has played a key role in reconfiguring the dynamics of 
British party politics in recent years. 
 
Moving beyond the confines of single member states, the insights offered by Conti’s (2018) 
comparative analysis of national members of parliament (MPs) demonstrates that the 
(positive) attitudes of mainstream politicians towards European integration have not 
genuinely changed in recent years. This would suggest that Euroscepticism typically remains 
an attribute of parties at the fringes of the political spectrum (Taggart 1998), even if, largely 
due to the growing electoral successes of Eurosceptic populist parties themselves, 
Euroscepticism has become a more prominent feature of European party systems. A 
different question, however, is whether mainstream politicians are also eager to publicly 
offer unconditional support for the ‘European project’. Certainly, when under pressure from 
Eurosceptic challengers, it remains tempting for them to shift the blame for unpopular 
policies onto the EU, while claiming credit for successes which may have been facilitated by 
the single market or EU policies. 
 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
Table 1 attempts to collate the materials we have on country cases from the contributions 
to this Special Issue so that we can systematise some of the comparative findings. The 
interpretation of the data is that of the Special Issue editors, and involves some 
interpretation and extrapolation from the material provided by the Special Issue 
contributors. Columns 1 and 2 lay out the country cases and the relevant parties. The third 
column labels the populist Euroscepticism of the parties in left-right terms and shows how 
there is significant right and left populist Euroscepticism. In column 4, we highlight which of 
the three crises had most resonance in each of the country cases based primarily on our 
reading of the case studies. In column 5, we list the frame that is most dominant for 
Euroscepticism in the country cases. In columns 7 and 8, we summarise the impact of 
populist Euroscepticism along the two dimensions we have outlined above. 
 
On the whole, the Special Issue has brought crises and ‘Europe’ into the analysis of populism 
and Euroscepticism. Having acknowledged the existence of ‘many types of redemptive 
discourses’ across the left-right ideological spectrum, we aimed at placing the ‘cosmic 
struggle between a reified “will of the people” and a conspiring elite’ (Hawkins and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2017: 514-516) within the context of the multiple European crises. Through 
different perspectives and methodological persuasions, we tried to reconcile populism with 
the Great Recession, the migrant crisis, and Brexit and see how ‘different political actors 
attempt to come to terms, resolve and/or manipulate’ these events (Stavrakakis et al. 2017: 
2). In fact, despite a self-evident connection between the rise of populism and critical 
conjunctures (e.g. Taggart 2000), little attempts have been made to interpret crises as 
performative acts that are socially and discursively constructed (cf. Moffitt 2016). In other 
words, populist actors may ‘actively perform and perpetuate a sense of crisis, rather than 
simply reacting to external crisis’ (Moffitt 2015: 195). We saw the last decade offering 
unprecedented opportunities for populist actors to demonise EU elites and frame them as 
responsible for the crises. Indeed, a Eurosceptic discourse may contribute to activating 
latent feelings of discontent or populist attitudes among citizens (see Hawkins et al. 2019).  
 
Focusing on the ability of actors to perform crises allows us to overcome structuralist 
notions of crisis as triggering factor, or mere background context (e.g. Kriesi and Pappas 
2015). While the succession in series of the Great Recession, the migrant crisis, and Brexit 
may represent a ‘perfect storm’ for populism (Brubaker 2017), we should also be aware that 
they may be linked with pre-existing structural conditions, conjunctural actions, and 
contingent strategic or volitional action (Sewell 2005: 109). This largely resonates with the 
changing and non-necessarily sequential framing of Europe by populist radical right parties 
in the wake of the Great Recession (Pirro and Van Kessel 2017). Ultimately, as the Special 
Issue contributions have also shown, Euroscepticism is not always a central element of 
populist parties’ agendas (see also Pirro 2014; Van Kessel 2015).  
 
Our findings have implications for the existing literature on Euroscepticism. The focus of this 
literature has primarily been in public Euroscepticism and party-based Euroscepticism (see 
Leruth et al. 2017). Recent work on public Euroscepticism has attempted to extend the 
conceptualisation of Euroscepticism into different types (De Vries 2018), reflecting the work 
on party-based Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008). What this Special Issue shows 
is the importance of different frames and the differential salience of these frames in 
different European contexts. Clearly then our research fits well with the increasing focus on 
the need to both disaggregate Euroscepticism and to differentiate salience. Our focus on 
how crises are also related to Euroscepticism fits well with a body of work focused on crises 
effects (Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Serricchio et al. 2013; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2018).  
 
The Special Issue also speaks to the broader literature on party competition, and the 
strategic behaviour of niche or challenger parties in particular. For parties on the ideological 
fringes, taking a Eurosceptic position is one way to put distance between themselves and 
mainstream parties (Taggart 1998). Previous studies have further shown that fringe parties 
can be successful in gaining support on the basis of their Euroscepticism, and thus ‘have a 
strategic incentive to mobilize the EU issue in order to reap electoral gains’ (De Vries 2007: 
368; see also De Vries 2010; De Vries and Hobolt 2012). The EU issue can also be 
successfully used as a so-called ‘wedge issue’: increasing its salience may expose dissent 
over the issue among rival parties and cause reputational damage (Van de Wardt et al. 
2014). What the studies in this Special Issue have shown, however, is that politicisation of 
the EU issue is not always considered a viable strategy by populist parties, and that the 
three selected crises have not consistently served as ‘external stimuli’ for hardened and 
more pronounced Euroscepticism (see Harmel and Janda 1994).  
 
One reason for this may be the fact that more specific and tangible issues, such as 
immigration and social deprivation, have been considered more potent in terms of electoral 
competition. Focusing on such issues has proven electorally fruitful for populist parties, and 
given that parties have little reason to change tack when they (or their counterparts abroad) 
are successful (see Somer-Topcu 2009), a change in course on ‘Europe’ may not seem a 
rational strategy. Differing visions, either among party supporters or members, about which 
precise position to take on the EU may also be a reason for populist parties to downplay the 
issue in order to prevent electoral losses or internal dissent (Steenbergen and Scott 2004; 
Rovny 2013; Van de Wardt 2014). What is clear, in any case, is that populist parties remain 
disunited in the intensity of their Euroscepticism, and do not all (consistently) treat 
Euroscepticism as a core issue (Pirro and Van Kessel 2017; Vasilopoulou 2018). The crises 
have not clearly altered the manner in which they use the EU issue as a tool in their 
competition with (mainstream) rivals. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The contributions in this Special Issue suggest that populist parties have been selective in 
their politicisation of the individual crises, and take different positions on the issue of 
European integration more generally. First, we can see an important difference between 
left-wing and right-wing variants of the populist politics of Euroscepticism. While all left-
wing populists stuck to their guns, framing their criticism of Europe mainly in socioeconomic 
terms, the Great Recession offered right-wing populists the opportunity to elaborate on 
similar discourses, only to return to culturally inspired notions Euroscepticism at the peak of 
the migration crisis. Effectively, the M5S in Italy had been the only actor to hover between 
different framings among beside straightforward right-wing populist parties. 
 
The second conclusion is that while there is a diverse picture, it does appear that in terms of 
impact the mainstream in many countries remains remarkably resilient against populist 
Euroscepticism. The impact on party systems is predominantly ‘low’ or ‘moderate’. The 
cases of ‘high’ impact are those most affected by the economic crisis – or in the case of 
Brexit, it is of course the UK. There is a danger then that the focus of our attention in 
considering the impact of Eurosceptic populists is on the spectacular cases where impact is 
high. And while there are these cases, we need to be more measured and more rigorously 
comparative before we generalise from the spectacular cases to wider trends.  
 
At the same time, we should not uncritically assume that the electoral rise of Eurosceptic 
populists is primarily related to their Euroscepticism as such. Opposition to Europe neatly 
fits into their broader ideological profile but populist parties on the left and right do not 
necessarily treat ‘Europe’ as their most important theme. Although, partly due to the recent 
crises, European integration has become a more salient issue for voters across the 
continent, we should not be too quick to interpret their support for populist parties mainly 
as an expression of Eurosceptic sentiments.  
 
There are two additional notes of caution that we should raise with respect to our findings. 
The first is geographical. We should be careful to note that the cases in this Special Issue are 
all West European cases and there is evidence to suggest that there is some very different 
patterning in Central and Eastern Europe (Pirro and Van Kessel 2017; Taggart and Szczerbiak 
2018).  Thinking about Europe as a whole may mean something very different from thinking 
about it in parts. And we also need to be aware of the contingent nature of our findings. 
Particularly in the case of Brexit, we are talking about a process that is ongoing and which is 
likely to develop in unpredictable ways. Crises and impacts rarely have clear cut-off points 
and so we need to be prepared to revisit these conclusions. 
 
What is clear however is that the confluence of populism and Euroscepticism has come at a 
time of real crises in policy terms for European political parties. The effects and impacts of 
those crises have, as we have seen, differed in the cases we have examined. The cocktail of 
anti-establishment populist parties with the increasing politicisation of European integration 
as an issue in domestic polities is an unmistakably powerful one. Added to this, the diverse 
effects of individual and cumulative crises in Europe around the economy, migration, and 
the exit of a key member state from the EU, shows us the growth of populist Euroscepticism 
across our cases as well as some key differences in both scale and form of it in different 
polities. 
 
While the studies in our Special Issue have discussed the varied framing of European 
integration and the variety of Eurosceptic arguments by political actors, further research is 
needed to assess the embeddedness of crises in populists’ performance as well as the 
impact of such framing on citizens’ opinions and voting behaviour. Current research is often 
concerned with the question of whether public Euroscepticm is primarily driven by cultural 
or economic attitudes (e.g. van Elsas and van der Brug 2015), but we still know little about 
how cultural and economic attitudes and anxieties may interact and feed into 
Euroscepticism. The other key question from our research relates to the EU itself and how 
far populist Euroscepticism functions within the institutions of the EU itself and the way in 
which these crises have been framed and salient within the European Parliament (EP). We 
have considered populist Euroscepticism as a largely exogenous factor but, given the 
developing scholarship in Euroscepticism within the EP (e.g. Brack 2017) it would be 
important to see how the meshing of Euroscepticism with populism acts as an endogenous 
factor within the EU. In the face of these challenges, interpreting populists’ propagation of 
crisis as either triggering or intervening factor would attribute new meaning to the nested 
relationship between populism, Euroscepticism, and crisis. 
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